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Abstract
Several frictions restrict the governments ability to tax assets. First of all, it is very costly
to monitor trades on international asset markets. Moreover, agents can resort to non-observable
low-return assets such as cash, gold or foreign currencies if taxes on observable assets become too
high. This paper shows that limitations in asset observability have important consequences for the
taxation of labor income. Using a dynamic moral hazard model of social insurance, we nd that
optimal labor income taxes typically become less progressive when assets are imperfectly observed.
We evaluate the e¤ect quantitatively in a model calibrated to U.S. data.
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1 Introduction
The existence of international asset markets implies that taxation authorities do not have perfect (or
low cost) control over agentswealth and consumption. This creates an important obstacle for tax
policy:
In a world of high and growing capital mobility there is a limit to the amount of tax
that can be levied without inducing investors to hide their wealth in foreign tax havens.
(Mirrlees Review 2010, p.916)
Even when agents choose not to hide their wealth abroad, they have access to number of non-observable
storage technologies at home, both in developed and developing countries. For example, agents can
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accumulate cash, gold, or durable goods. These assets typically bring low returns, but may nonetheless
impose important restrictions for the collection of taxes on assets that are more easily observed.
Motivated by these considerations, this paper explores optimal tax systems in a framework where
assets are imperfectly observable. We contrast two stylized environments. In the rst one, consumption
and assets are observable (and contractable) for the government. In the second environment, these
choices are private information. We compare the constrained e¢ cient allocations of the two scenarios.
When absolute risk-aversion is convex, we nd that optimal consumption in the scenario with hidden
assets moves in a less concave (or more convex) way with labor income. In this sense, the optimal
allocation becomes less progressive in that scenario. This nding can be easily rephrased in terms of
the progressivity of labor income taxes, since our model allows for a straightforward decentralization:
optimal allocations can be implemented by letting agents pay nonlinear taxes on labor income and
linear taxes on assets (Gottardi and Pavoni 2011).1 Our results show that marginal labor income
taxes should become less progressive when the governments ability to tax/observe asset holdings is
imperfect.
We derive our results in a simple dynamic model of social insurance. A continuum of ex-ante
identical agents inuence their labor incomes by exerting e¤ort. Labor income realizations are not
perfectly controllable and e¤ort is private information. This creates a moral hazard problem. The
social planner thus faces a trade-o¤ between insuring agents against idiosyncratic income uncertainty
on the one hand and the associated disincentive e¤ects on the other hand. In addition, agents have
access to a risk-free asset, which gives them limited means for self-insurance. In this model, the planner
wants to distort agentsasset decisions, because asset accumulation provides insurance against the
labor income shocks and thereby reduces the incentives to exert e¤ort.2
Using the rst-order approach (Abraham, Koehne and Pavoni 2011), we can switch from the
observable asset case to the scenario with hidden asset accumulation by adding the agents Euler
equation as a constraint to the principals optimization problem. This constraint crucially changes
the allocation of consumption across income states. E¢ ciency requires that for each income state the
costs of increasing the agents utility by a marginal unit equal the benets of doing so. Due to the
Euler equation, it becomes important how such changes in utility a¤ect the agents marginal utility.
One can show that a marginal increase of utility in a state with consumption c reduces the agents
marginal utility in that state by  u00(c)=u0(c).3 This relaxes the Euler equation and thereby modies
how the gains of allocating utility vary in the cross-section. Obviously, the Euler equation a¤ects the
1 In the scenario with hidden assets, the tax rate on assets is zero, of course.
2See Diamond and Mirrlees (1978), Rogerson (1985), and Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski (2003).
3To increase u(c) by ", c has to be increased by "=u0(c). Using a rst-order approximation, this changes the agents
marginal utility by u0(c)  u0(c+ "=u0(c))   "u00(c)=u0(c).
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costs and benets of allocating utility also by changing the shadow costs of the remaining constraints
of the principals problem. However, we show that the former e¤ect is key. If absolute risk-aversion
is convex, we thus nd that optimal consumption becomes a more convex function of labor income
when asset accumulation is not observable. Put di¤erently, marginal taxes on labor income become
less progressive when asset income cannot be su¢ ciently taxed.
Intuitively, imperfect observability of assets entails that the planner can rely less on consumption
frontloading (Rogerson 1985, Golosov, Kocherlakota and Tsyvinski 2003) to create incentives. As a
consequence, the cross-sectional structure of consumption needs to be modied. Notice, however, that
there are two distinct ways of creating stronger incentives using the consumption cross-section. One
possibility is to increase the rewards for high performance, so that consumption becomes a more convex
function of income, loosely speaking. The second option is to impose more severe punishments for low
income realizations, which makes consumption more concave instead. We nd that the curvature of
the agents coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion determines which of the two possibilities dominates.
Clearly, optimal incentives are shaped by the planners costs and benets of allocating utility across
income states, and these costs and benets include a component that relates to marginal changes
in the agents Euler equation. As explained above, this implies that the curvature of absolute risk
aversion determines how asset accumulation changes the optimal incentive scheme.
In a quantitative exercise, we estimate some of the key parameters of the model. We use con-
sumption and income data from the PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) as adapted by Blundell,
Pistaferri and Preston (2008) and postulate that the data is generated by a tax system in which labor
income taxes are set optimally given an asset income tax rate of 40%.4 Using the implied parameters,
we compute the optimal allocation when asset income taxation is unrestricted and compare it to the
data. Under unrestricted asset taxation, the progressivity of the optimal allocation increases sizably.
The welfare gain of unrestricted asset taxation varies with the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion and
amounts to 1.3% in consumption equivalent terms for our benchmark calibration. The required asset
income tax rates are implausibly high, however, being close to one hundred per cent or above for all
specications. This suggests that imperfect asset observability/taxability is the empirically relevant
case for the United States.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper that explores optimal income taxation in a
framework where assets are imperfectly observable. Recent work on dynamic Mirrleesian economies
analyzes optimal income taxes when assets are observable/taxable without frictions; see Golosov,
Troshkin, and Tsyvinski (2011), and Farhi and Werning (2011). In those works, the reason for asset
4This rate is in line with U.S. e¤ective tax rates on capital income calculated by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994),
and Domeij and Heathcote (2004).
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taxation is very similar to our model and stems from disincentive e¤ects associated with the accumu-
lation of wealth. While the Mirrlees (1971) framework focuses on redistribution in a population with
heterogeneous skills that are exogenously distributed, our approach highlights the social insurance
(or ex-post redistribution) aspect of income taxation. In spirit, our model is therefore closer to the
works by Varian (1980) and Eaton and Rosen (1980). With respect to the nonobservability of assets,
our model is related to Golosov and Tsyvinski (2007), who analyze capital subsidies/distortions in a
dynamic Mirrleesian economy with private insurance markets and hidden asset trades.
An entirely di¤erent link between labor income and capital income taxation is explored by Conesa,
Kitao and Krueger (2009). Using a life-cycle model with time-varying labor supply elasticities and
borrowing constraints, they argue that capital income taxes and progressive labor income taxes are
two alternative ways of mimicking age-dependent taxation. They then use numerical methods to de-
termine the e¢ cient relation between the two instruments. Interestingly, in the present environment
capital taxes play an entirely di¤erent role and we obtain very di¤erent conclusions. While in Conesa,
Kitao and Krueger (2009) capital income taxes and progressive labor income taxes are substitutable
instruments, in our model they are complements. Laroque (2010) derives analytically a similar substi-
tutability between labor income and capital income taxes, restricting labor taxation to be nonlinear
but homogenous across age groups. In both these cases, the substitutability arises because exogenously
restricted labor income taxes are in general imperfect instruments to perform redistribution. In our
(fully-optimal taxation) environment, labor income taxes can achieve any feasible re-distributional
target. The role of capital taxes is to facilitate the use of such re-distributional instrument in the
presence of informational asymmetries. Hence we obtain a complementarity between capital taxes
and labor income tax progressivity.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on optimal tax progressivity in static models. This
literature highlights the roles of the skill distribution (Mirrlees, 1971), the welfare criterion (Sadka,
1976), and earnings elasticities (Saez, 2001), among other things (for a recent survey on the issue,
see Diamond and Saez, 2011). However, dynamic considerations and in particular asset decisions are
absent in those works. The present paper emphasizes the link between income tax progressivity and
the availability of savings technologies.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the setup of the model. Section 3 presents the
main result of the paper: hidden asset accumulation makes optimal consumption schemes less progres-
sive. In Section 4, we explore alternative concepts of concavity/progressivity. Section 5 explores the
quantitative importance of our results, while Section 6 concludes and considers a couple of extensions
to the model.
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2 Model
Consider a benevolent social planner (the principal) whose objective is to maximize the welfare of its
citizens. The (small open) economy consists of a continuum of ex-ante identical agents who live for
two periods, t = 0; 1, and can inuence their date-1 labor income realizations by exerting e¤ort. The
planner designs an allocation to insure them against idiosyncratic risk and provide them appropriate
incentives for working hard. The planners budget must be (intertemporally) balanced.
Preferences The agent derives utility from consumption ct  c   1 and e¤ort et  0 ac-
cording to u(ct; et); where u is a concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable function which is strictly
increasing and strictly concave in ct, strictly decreasing and (weakly) concave in et. We assume that
consumption and e¤ort are complements: u00ec(ct; et)  0: This specication of preferences includes
both the additively separable case, u (c; e) = u (c)  v (e) ; and the case with monetary costs of e¤ort,
u(c   v (e)); assuming v is strictly increasing and convex. The agents discount factor is denoted by
 > 0:
Technology and endowments The technological process can be seen as the production of
human capital through costly e¤ort, where human capital represents any characteristic that determines
the agents productivity. At date t = 0; the agent has a xed endowment y0: At date t = 1; the agent
has a stochastic income y 2 Y := [y; y]. The realization of y is publicly observable, while the probability
distribution over Y is a¤ected by the agents unobservable e¤ort level e0 that is exerted at t = 0. The
probability density of this distribution is given by the smooth function f(y; e0). As in most of the the
optimal contracting literature, we assume full support, that is f(y; e0) > 0 for all y 2 Y; and e0  0.
There is no production or any other action at t  2: Since utility is strictly decreasing in e¤ort, the
agent exerts e¤ort e1 = 0 at date 1. In what follows, we therefore use the notation u1(c) := u(c; 0) for
date-1 utility.
The agent has access to a linear savings technology that allows him to transfer qb0 units of date-0
consumption into b0 units of date-1 consumption. The savings technology is observable for the planner.
Allocations An allocation (c; e0) consists of a consumption scheme c = (c0; c()) and a rec-
ommended e¤ort level e0. The consumption scheme has two components: c0 denotes the agents
consumption in period t = 0, and c(y); y 2 Y , denotes the agents consumption in period t = 1 condi-
tional on income realization y. An allocation (c0; c(); e0) is called feasible if it satises the planners
budget constraint
y0   c0 + q
Z y
y
(y   c(y))f(y; e0) dy  G  0; (1)
5
where G denotes government consumption and q is the rate at which planner and agent transfer
resources over time.
Second best The agents savings technology is observable (and contractable) for the planner.
Hence, without loss of generality, we can assume that the planner directly controls consumption. A
second best allocation is an allocation that maximizes ex-ante welfare5
max
(c;e0)
u(c0; e0) + 
Z y
y
u1(c(y))f(y; e0) dy
subject to c0  c, c(y)  c, e0  0, the planners budget constraint
y0   c0 + q
Z y
y
(y   c(y))f(y; e0) dy  G  0; (2)
and the incentive compatibility constraint for e¤ort
e0 2 argmax
e
u(c0; e) + 
Z y
y
u1(c(y))f(y; e) dy: (3)
2.1 Decentralization and the rst-order approach
Any second best allocation can be generated as an equilibrium outcome of a competitive environment
where agents exert e¤ort and save/borrow subject to appropriate taxes on income and assets. To
simplify the analysis, we assume throughout this paper that the rst-order approach (FOA) is valid.
This enables us to characterize the agents choice of e¤ort e0 and assets b0 based on the associated
rst-order conditions. Su¢ cient conditions for the validity of the FOA in this setup are given in
Abraham, Koehne, and Pavoni (2011). Specically, the FOA is valid if the agent has nonincreasing
absolute risk aversion and the cumulative distribution function of income is log-convex in e¤ort.6
When the FOA holds, second best allocations can be decentralized by imposing a linear tax on
assets, complemented by suitably dened nonlinear labor income taxes.
5Although for pure notational simplicity we consider the case with a continuum of output levels, we do not discuss in
detail the technicalities related to the existence of a solution and the existence of the multipliers in innite dimensional
spaces. We can provide details; alternatively, the reader can read the model as one with a large but nite number of
output levels.
6As discussed by Abraham, Koehne, and Pavoni (2011), both conditions have quite broad empirical support. First,
virtually all estimations of u reveal NIARA; see Guiso and Paiella (2008) for example. The condition on the distribution
function essentially restricts the agents Frisch elasticity of labor supply. This restriction is satised as long as the Frisch
elasticity is smaller than unity. In fact, most empirical studies nd values for this elasticity between 0 and 0.5; see Domeij
and Floden (2006), for instance.
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Proposition 1 (Decentralization) Suppose that the FOA is valid and let (c0; c(); e0) be a second
best allocation that is interior: c0 > c, c(y) > c, y 2 Y , e0 > 0. Then there exists a tax system
consisting of income transfers (0; ()) and an after-tax asset price ~q (> q) such that
c0 = y0 + 0;
c(y) = y + (y); y 2 Y;
(e0; 0) 2 argmax
(e;b)
u(y0 + 0   ~qb; e) + 
Z y
y
u1(y + (y) + b)f(y; e) dy: (4)
In other words, there exists a tax system (0; (); ~q) that decentralizes the allocation (c0; c(); e0).
The above result is intuitive and the proof is omitted (compare Gottardi and Pavoni (2011)). It
is e¢ cient to tax the savings technology, because savings provide intertemporal insurance when the
agent plans to shirk. The reason why a linear tax on assets is su¢ cient to obtain the second best
becomes apparent once we replace the incentive constraint (4) by the associated rst-order conditions
u0e(y0 + 0; e0) + 
Z y
y
u1(y + (y))fe(y; e0) dy  0; (5)
~qu0c(y0 + 0; e0)  
Z y
y
u01(y + (y))f(y; e0) dy  0: (6)
The second condition (6) determines the agents asset decision exclusively based on consumption levels
and the price ~q: This means that the planner can essentially ignore the problem of joint deviations
when taxing asset trades. It is now clear that by choosing a su¢ ciently large value for ~q; the planner
can in fact ignore this last constraint and obtain the second best allocation.
Notice that we have normalized asset holdings to b0 = 0 in the above proposition. This is without
loss of generality, since there is an indeterminacy between 0 and b0. The planner can generate the
same allocation with a system (0; (); ~q) and b0 = 0 or with a system (0   ~q"; () + "; ~q) and b0 = "
for any value of ". This indeterminacy is of course not surprising, because the timing of tax collection
is irrelevant by Ricardian equivalence.
Besides allowing for a very natural decentralization, the FOA also generates a sharp characteri-
zation of second best consumption schemes. Assuming that consumption is interior, the rst-order
conditions of the Lagrangian with respect to consumption are:7

u0c(c0; e0)
= 1 + 
u00ec(c0; e0)
u0c(c0; e0)
; (7)
q
u01(c(y))
= 1 + 
fe(y; e0)
f(y; e0)
; y 2 [y; y]; (8)
7A su¢ cient condition for interiority is, for example, u0e(c; 0) = 0 for all c > c in combination with the Inada condition
limc!c u0c(c; 0) =1:
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where  and  are the (nonnegative) Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint (2)
and the rst-order version of the incentive constraint (3), respectively.
Finally, we note that a tax on the asset price q is equivalent to a tax rate t on the rate of return
(constant across agents) given by:

1 +

1
q   1

(1  t)
 1
= ~q:
2.2 Hidden assets and third best allocations
While savings technologies such as domestic bank accounts, pension funds, or houses may be observable
at moderate costs, there are many alternative ways of transferring resources over time that are more
di¢ cult to monitor. For instance, agents may open accounts at foreign banks, or they may accumulate
cash, gold, or durable goods. These technologies typically bring low returns (or involve transaction
costs of various sorts), but are prohibitively costly to observe for tax authorities. Hence, if the after-tax
return of the observable savings technology, 1=~q, becomes too low, agents have a strong incentive to
use nonobservable assets to run away from taxation.
Notice that, even though we focus on a particular decentralization mechanism in this paper, the
above problem is general. Decentralizations that allow asset taxes to depend on the agents period-1
income realization (Kocherlakota 2005), for instance, can generate zero asset taxes on average, but
generally require high tax rates for a sizable part of the population.8
This motivates the study of optimal allocations and decentralizations when agents have access
to a nonobservable savings technology. We assume that the nonobservable technology is linear and
transfers qn  q units of date-0 consumption into one unit of date-1 consumption. Using the FOA, we
dene a third best allocation as an allocation (c0; c(); e0) that maximizes ex-ante welfare
max
(c;e0)
u(c0; e0) + 
Z y
y
u1(c(y))f(y; e0) dy
subject to c0  c, c(y)  c, e0  0, the planners budget constraint
y0   c0 + q
Z y
y
(y   c(y))f(y; e0) dy  G  0 (9)
8For example, assuming additively separable preferences and CRRA consumption utility, the tax rate on asset holdings
in such a decentralization would be 1  q


c(y)
c0

, where  is the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion. For incentive reasons,
c(y) tends to be signicantly below c0 for a range of income levels y, which results in tax rates on assets close to 1 at
those income levels. In other words, almost their entire wealth (not just asset income) would be taxed away for those
agents.
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and the rst-order incentive conditions for e¤ort and nonobservable savings
u0e(c0; e0) + 
Z y
y
u1(c(y))fe(y; e0) dy  0; (10)
qnu0c(c0; e0)  
Z y
y
u01(c(y))f(y; e0) dy  0: (11)
Obviously, in our terminology the notion second best refers to constrained e¢ cient allocations
subject to nonobservability of e¤ort, while the term third bestrefers to constrained e¢ cient alloca-
tions subject to nonobservability of e¤ort and assets/consumption
To decentralize a third best allocation (c0; c(); e0), we dene taxes/transfers (0; ()) on labor
income and an after-tax price ~q of the observable asset as follows:
0 = c0   y0;
(y) = c(y)  y; y 2 Y;
~q = qn:
If agents face this tax system and have access to the nonobservable savings technologies at rate qn,
the resulting allocation will obviously be (c0; c(); e0).
Again we can use the FOA to characterize the consumption scheme. Assuming interiority, the
rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian with respect to consumption are now:

u0c(c0; e0)
= 1 + 
u00ec(c0; e0)
u0c(c0; e0)
+ qn
u00cc(c0; e0)
u0c(c0; e0)
; (12)
q
u01(c(y))
= 1 + 
fe(y; e0)
f(y; e0)
+ a(c(y)); y 2 [y; y]; (13)
where ,  and  are the (nonnegative) Lagrange multipliers associated with the budget constraint
(9), the rst-order condition for e¤ort (10), and the Euler equation (11), respectively.
Proposition 2 Suppose that the FOA is valid and let (c0; c(); e0) be a third best allocation that is
interior. Then there exists a number q > q such that equations (12) and (13) characterizing the
consumption scheme are satised with  > 0 whenever qn < q.
Proof. Fix qn. From the Kuhn-Tucker theorem we have   0. If  > 0, we are done. If  = 0,
then the rst-order conditions of the Lagrangian read

u0c(c0; e0)
= 1 + 
u00ec(c0; e0)
u0c(c0; e0)
;
q
u01(c(y))
= 1 + 
fe(y; e0)
f(y; e0)
; y 2 [y; y]:
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Since f(y; e) is a density, integration of the last line yieldsZ y
y
q
u01(c(y))
f(y; e0) dy = 1:
Using   0 and the assumption u00ec  0; we obtain

u0c(c0; e0)
 1 =
Z y
y
q
u01(c(y))
f(y; e0) dy  q

R y
y u
0
1(c(y))f(y; e0) dy
;
where the last inequality follows from Jensens inequality. This inequality is in fact strict, since the
agent cannot be fully insured when e¤ort is interior. Hence - since from the previous condition we
have  > 0 - we conclude

Z y
y
u01(c(y))f(y; e0) dy > qu
0
c(c0; e0): (14)
Clearly, exactly the same allocation delivering condition (14) is obtainable for all qn by ignoring the
agents Euler equation. If we now dene q > q such that

Z y
y
u01(c(y))f(y; e0) dy = qu
0
c(c0; e0);
it is immediate to see that whenever qn < q the allocation we obtained above ignoring the agents
Euler equation is, in fact, incompatible with (11), hence we must have  > 0: Q.E.D.
Proposition 2 states that if the return on the nonobservable savings technology 1qn is su¢ ciently
high (although possibly lower than the return on observable savings), the agents Euler equation will
be binding in the planners problem. To simplify the exposition, we set qn := q from now on, so that
the returns of the nonobservable and observable savings technologies coincide. All our results will be
independent of the particular choice of qn and rely only on the fact the Euler equation is binding for
the planner in that case.9
Comparing the characterization of third best consumption schemes, (12), (13), to the character-
ization of second best consumption schemes, (7), (8), we notice that the di¤erence between the two
environments is closely related to the e¤ect of the agents Euler equation (11) and the associated
Lagrange multiplier . We discuss the implications of this nding in detail in the next section.
3 Absolute progressivity and linear likelihoods
We are interested in the shape of second best and third best consumption schemes c(y). As we
saw above, this shape is related one-to-one to the curvature of labor income taxes in the associated
decentralizations.
9The quantitative analysis in Section 5 suggests that a binding Euler equation is indeed the empirically relevant case.
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Denition 1 We say that an allocation (c0; c(); e0) is progressive if c0(y) is decreasing in y. We call
the allocation regressive if c0(y) is increasing in y.
Recall that (y) = c(y)   y denotes the agents transfer and labor income wedge, hence  (y)
represents the labor income tax. Denition 1 implies that whenever a consumption scheme is progres-
sive (regressive), we have a tax system with increasing (decreasing) marginal taxes   0(y) on labor
income supporting it.
In a progressive system, taxes are increasing faster than income does. At the same time, for the
states when the agent is receiving a transfer, transfers are increasing slower than income is decreasing.
The opposite happens when we have a regressive scheme. Intuitively, if the scheme is progressive,
incentives are provided more by imposing large penaltiesfor low income realizations, since consump-
tion decreases relatively quickly when income decreases. Regressive schemes, by contrast, put more
emphasis on rewards for high income levels than punishments for low income levels.
The next proposition provides su¢ cient conditions for progressivity and regressivity of e¢ cient
allocations.
Proposition 3 (Su¢ cient conditions for progressivity/regressivity) Assume that the FOA is
justied and that second best and third best allocations are interior.
(i) If the likelihood ratio function l (y; e) := fe(y;e)f(y;e) is concave in y and
1
u01(c)
is convex in c,
then second best allocations are progressive. If, in addition, absolute risk aversion a(c) is
decreasing and concave, then third best allocations are progressive as well.
(ii) On the other hand, if l (y; e) is convex in y and 1
u01(c)
is concave in c, then second best
allocations are regressive. If, in addition, absolute risk aversion a(c) is decreasing and
convex, then third best allocations are regressive as well.
Proof. We only show (i), since statement (ii) can be seen analogously. Dene
g(c) :=
q
u01(c)
  a(c):
By concavity of u; 1
u01() is always increasing. Therefore, if
1
u01() is convex and  = 0 (or  > 0 and
a() decreasing and concave), then g() is increasing and convex. Given the validity of the FOA,
equation (8) (or equation (13), respectively) shows that second best (third best) consumption schemes
are characterized as follows:
g (c(y)) = 1 +  l (y; e0) ;
11
where, by assumption, the right-hand side is a positive a¢ ne transformation of a concave function. By
applying the inverse function of g() to both sides, we see that c () is concave since it is an increasing
and concave transformation of a concave function. Q.E.D.
Note that in the previous proposition, since the function g is increasing, consumption is increasing
as long as the likelihood ratio function l (y; e) is increasing in y.
Proposition 3 implies that CARA utilities with concave likelihood ratios lead to progressive schemes,
both in the second best and the third best.10 In the second best, progressive schemes are also induced
by concave likelihood ratios and CRRA utilities with   1, since 1
u01(c)
= c is convex in this case. For
logarithmic utility with linear likelihood ratios we obtain second best schemes that are proportional,
since 1
u01(c)
= c is both concave and convex. Interestingly, third best schemes are regressive in this case
(since absolute risk aversion a(c) = 1c is convex).
11
This particular nding sheds light on a more general pattern under convex absolute risk aversion:
when assets are observable (second best), the allocation has a more concave relationship between
labor income and consumption. In other words, observability of assets calls for more progressivity in
the labor income tax system. The next result formalizes this insight.
Proposition 4 (Concavity) Assume that the FOA is justied and let (c0; c(); e0) be an interior,
monotonic second best allocation and (c^0; c^(); e0) be an interior, monotonic third best allocation,
both implementing e¤ort level e0. Suppose that u1 has convex absolute risk aversion and that
the likelihood ratio l (y; e0) is linear in y. Under these conditions, if c^ is progressive, then c is
as well.
Proof. Given validity of the FOA, by equations (8) and (13) the consumption schemes c(y) and
c^(y) are characterized as follows:
g (c(y)) = 1 +  l (y; e0) , where g (c) :=
q
u01(c)
; (15)
g^^;^ (c^(y)) = 1 + ^ l (y; e0) , where g^^;^ (c) :=
^q
u01(c)
  ^a(c); with ^ > 0: (16)
Since l (y; e) is linear in y by assumption, concavity of c^ is equivalent to convexity of g^^;^: Moreover,
since a(c) is convex in c by assumption, convexity of g^^;^ implies convexity of g =

^

g^^;^ + ^a

.
Finally, notice that convexity of g is equivalent to concavity of c, since l (y; e) is linear in y: Q.E.D.
10Other cases where progressivity/regressivity does not di¤er between second best and third best are when a has the
same shape as 1
u01
(quadratic utility) and when a is linear (and hence increasing).
11More precisely, consumption is characterized by q

c(y)    1
c(y)
= 1 +  l(y; e) in this case. Since the left-hand side
is concave in c and the right-hand side is linear in y, the consumption scheme c(y) must be convex in y.
12
In order to obtain a clearer intuition of this result, we further examine the planners rst-order
condition (13), namely
q
u01(c(y))
= 1 + 
fe(y; e0)
f(y; e0)
+ a(c(y)):
This expression equates the discounted present value (normalized by f (y; e0)) of the costs and benets
of increasing the agents utility by one unit in state y. The increase in utility costs the planner q
u01(c(y))
units in consumption terms. Multiplied by the shadow price of resources , we obtain the left-hand
side of the above expression. In terms of benets, rst of all, since the agents utility is increased by
one unit, there is a return of 1. Furthermore, increasing the agents utility also relaxes the incentive
constraint for e¤ort, generating a return of fe(y;e0)f(y;e0) .
12 Finally, by increasing u1(c (y)) the planner
alleviates the saving motive of the agent. This gain, measured by a(c (y)), depends crucially on the
multiplier  of the agents Euler equation. When assets can be fully taxed (second best), we have
 = 0 and this gain vanishes. By lowering the net return of the asset, the planner is able to circumvent
the rst-order incentive constraint for assets. However, when asset taxation is ruled out (third best),
this constraint is binding and we have  > 0. Under convex absolute risk aversion, the term a(c (y))
is convex. This implies that, ceteris paribus, the benets of increasing the agents utility change in a
more convex way with labor income. As a consequence, in the third best the agents utility must also
change in a more convex way with labor income, hence consumption becomes more convex in y in this
case.
A closely related intuition for equation (13) can be obtained by rewriting it as follows:
q
u01(c(y))
  a(c(y)) = 1 + fe(y; e0)
f(y; e0)
:
On the right-hand side, we have the (rescaled) likelihood ratio. As in the static moral hazard problem,
this function governs the allocation of utility across income states y. The only change compared
to the static problem is the term a(c(y)) on the left-hand side. This term stems from the agents
Euler equation and modies the planners costs of allocating utility across states. In the static model,
allocating utility only generates a direct resource cost to the planner. This cost, captured by the
discounted inverse marginal utility, is also present here. In addition, allocating utility to state y
a¤ects the intertemporal structure of the consumption scheme, which creates an additional cost due
to the agents Euler equation.
12Of course, if the increase in consumption is done in a state with a negative likelihood ratio, this represents a cost
since the incentive constraint is in fact tightened.
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4 General results on progressivity
Since at least Holmstrom (1979), it is well known that consumption patterns under moral hazard are
crucially inuenced by the shape of the likelihood ratio function l(; e). Stated in more negative terms,
one can always nd functions l(; e) so that the shape of consumption is almost arbitrary. To make the
impact of asset observability on the shape of optimal consumption easier to observe, we have therefore
normalized the curvature of the likelihood ratio by assuming linearity in Proposition 4.
In this section, we study how the observability of assets changes the curvature of the consumption
scheme for arbitrary likelihood ratio functions. As usual, we assume that the FOA is justied and that
(c0; c(); e0) and (c^0; c^(); e0) are interior, monotonic second best and third best allocations, respectively,
implementing the same e¤ort level e0.
Probably the most well known ranking in terms of concavity in economics is that dictated by
concave transformations (e.g., Gollier 2001).
Denition 2 We say that f1 is a concave (convex) transformation of f2 if there is an increasing and
concave (convex) function v such that f1 = v  f2:
Proposition 5 Assume that u1 has convex absolute risk aversion. Then, if c^ is a concave transforma-
tion of l, then c is a concave transformation of l. Conversely, if c is a convex transformation
of l, then c^ has the same property.
Proof. Recall that we have
g (c(y)) = 1 +  l (y; e0) , (17)
g^^;^ (c^(y)) = 1 + ^ l (y; e0) , (18)
where the functions g and g^^;^ are dened as in (15) and (16), respectively. First, suppose that c^ is a
concave transformation of l: Since the right-hand side of (18) is a positive a¢ ne transformation of l, this
implies that g^^;^ is convex. Now, notice that convexity of g^^;^ implies that g (c) =

^

g^^;^(c) + ^a(c)

is convex as well (since a(c) is convex by assumption). Hence, using (17), we see that c is a concave
transformation of l.
Conversely, suppose that c is a convex transformation of l: Using (17), we see that g is then
concave. Convexity of a(c) implies that g^^;^ is then also concave, which shows that c^ is a convex
transformation of l: Q.E.D.
The previous result clearly generates a sense in which c is more progressivethan c^. Note that this
nding generalizes Proposition 4 to arbitrary shapes of the likelihood ratio function l. As a drawback,
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we can rank the curvature of c and c^ only when, for example, c^ is a concave transformation of l. We
will now reduce the set of possible utility functions to facilitate such comparisons.
Let us consider the class of HARA (or linear risk tolerance) utility functions, namely
u1 (c) = 

 +
c

1 
with 
1  

> 0; and  +
c

> 0:
For this class, we have a(c) =

 + c
 1
. Hence, absolute risk aversion is convex. Special cases of the
HARA class are CRRA, CARA, and quadratic utility (e.g., see Gollier 2001).
Lemma 1 Given a strictly increasing, di¤erentiable function u1 : [c;1) ! R, consider the two
functions dened as follows:
g (c) :=
q
u01(c)
;
g^^;^ (c) :=
^q
u01(c)
  ^a(c):
Then, if u1 belongs to the HARA class with    1, then g^^;^ is a concave transformation of
g for all ^; ^  0,  > 0.
Proof. If u belongs to the HARA class, we obtain
g^^;^(c) =
^

g(c)  ^a(c) = ^

g(c)  ^
1
  (g(c))
  1
 ; with  =

q
(1  )
 1

> 0:
In other words, we have
g^^;^(c) = h (g(c)) ; where h (g) =
^

g   ^ 1  g  1 :
The second derivative of h with respect to g is   ^
1
 


1
 + 1

g
  1

 2
; which is negative whenever
   1: Q.E.D.
The restriction    1 in the above result is innocuous to most applications and it allows for all
HARA functions with nonincreasing absolute risk aversion as well as quadratic utility, for instance.
Recall that second best and third best consumption schemes are characterized as follows:
g (c(y)) = 1 +  l (y; e0) ,
g^^;^ (c^(y)) = 1 + ^ l (y; e0) :
For logarithmic utility, g is linear. Lemma 1 therefore has the following consequence.
15
Corollary Suppose u1 is logarithmic. Then c is a concave transformation of c^:
Proof. By Lemma 1, there exists a concave function ~h such that c and c^ are related as follows:
c(y) = ~g 1  ~h  ~g (c^(y)) ;
where ~g(c) = 1

q
u0(c)   1

is increasing. For logarithmic utility, ~g is an a¢ ne function, which implies
that the composition ~g 1  ~h  ~g is concave whenever ~h is concave. Q.E.D.
To state the consequences of Lemma 1 for general HARA functions, we introduce the concept
of G-convexity (e.g., see Avriel et al., 1988), which is widely used in optimization. A function f is
G-convex if once we transform f with G we get a convex function. More formally:
Denition 3 Let f be a function and G an increasing function mapping from the image of f to the
real numbers. The function f is called G-convex (G-concave) if G  f is a convex (concave)
function.
This concept generalizes the standard notion of convexity. It is easy to see that a function f is
convex if and only if it is G-convex for any increasing a¢ ne function G. Moreover, it can be shown
that if G is concave and f is G-convex then f must be convex, but the converse is false.13
Lemma 2 Assume u1 belongs to the HARA class with    1: Then c is g-convex ( g-concave) if
and only if c^ is g^^;^-convex ( g^^;^-concave).
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Proof. Recall that consumption is determined as follows:
g (c(y)) = 1 +  l (y; e0) ;
g^^;^ (c^(y)) = 1 + ^ l (y; e0) .
As a consequence, we can relate the two consumption functions as follows:
1


g (c(y))  1

=
1
^

g^^;^ (c^(y))  1

: (19)
Now the result follows from the simple fact that convexity/concavity is preserved under positive a¢ ne
transformations. Q.E.D.
13For example, suppose f (x) = x2 and G () = log () ; then G(f(x)) = 2 log(x), which is obviously not convex.
14 In fact, this statement is not only true for concavity and convexity, but more generally for any property dened with
respect to the transformations g and g^^;^.
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Proposition 6 Assume u1 belongs to the HARA class with    1: If c^ is g-concave then c is
g-concave. Conversely, if c is g-convex then c^ is g-convex.
Proof. Let c^ be g-concave. By Lemma 1, we have g^^;^ = h  g for some increasing and concave
function h. Hence, when c^ is g-concave, then c^ must also be g^^;^-concave. Now Lemma 2 implies that
c is g-concave.
To verify the second statement, let c be g-convex. From Lemma 2, we see that c^ is g^^;^-convex,
i.e., g^^;^  c^ is convex. By Lemma 1, we have g^^;^ = h  g for some increasing and concave function h.
Since the inverse of h must be convex, we conclude that g  c^ = h 1  g^^;^  c^ is convex. Q.E.D.
Proposition 6 shows that whenever c^ satises the g-concavity property, then c satises this prop-
erty. In this sense, we note again that c is more progressivethan c^.
5 Quantitative analysis
This quantitative exercise serves two purposes. First, we extend our theoretical results. For example,
recall that the theoretical results compare two allocations that implement the same e¤ort level. In
a calibrated/estimated framework we show that the key result of complementarity between capital
taxation and labor income tax progressivity extends to the case where e¤ort is allowed to change
between the two scenarios.
The second target of this exercise is to evaluate quantitatively how the limited possibility of ob-
serving/taxing capital a¤ects optimal labor income taxes. In order to do this, we use consumption
and income data and postulate that the data is generated by a specication of the model where cap-
ital income is taxed at an exogenous rate of 40%. Equivalently, the distorted asset price is given by
~q = q0:6+0:4q . Note that the capital income tax of 40% is in line with U.S. e¤ective tax rates on capital
income as calculated by Mendoza, Razin and Tesar (1994) and Domeij and Heathcote (2004). We esti-
mate some of the key parameters of the model by matching joint moments of consumption and income
in an appropriately cleaned cross-sectional data. Then, we use the estimated (and postulated) para-
meters and also solve the model with optimal capital taxes, assuming perfect observability/taxability
of capital. The nal outcome is a comparison of the optimal labor income taxes between the two
scenarios.
5.1 Data
We use PSID (Panel Study of Income Dynamics) data for 1992 as adapted by Blundell, Pistaferri and
Preston (2008). This data source contains consumption data and income data at the household level.
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The consumption data is imputed using food consumption (measured at the PSID) and household
characteristics using the CEX (Survey of Consumption Expenditure) as a basis for the imputation
procedure. Household data is useful for two reasons: (i) Consumption can be credibly measured at
the household level only. (ii) Taxation is mostly determined at the family level (which is typically
equivalent to the household level) in the United States. We will use two measures of consumption: non-
durable consumption expenditure and total consumption expenditure, the latter being our benchmark
case.
In our model, we have ex-ante identical individuals who face the same (partially endogenous)
process of income shocks. In the data, however, income is inuenced by observable factors such as age,
education and race. We want to control for these characteristics to make income shocks comparable
across individuals. To do this, we postulate the following process for income:
yi = (Xi)i;
where yi is household is income, Xi are observable household characteristics (a constant, age, edu-
cation and race of the household head); and i is our measure of the cleaned income shock. In order
to isolate i, we regress log(yi) on Xi. The residual of this equation ^i is our estimate of the income
shock.
The next objective is to nd the consumption function. To be able to relate it to the cleaned
income measure i, we postulate that the consumption function is multiplicatively separable as well:
ci = g0(Zi)g1
 
(Xi)

c
 
i

where Zi are household characteristics that a¤ect consumption, but (by assumption) do not a¤ect
income, such as number of kids and beginning of period household assets. Our target is to identify
c (), the pure response of consumption to the income shock. To isolate this e¤ect, we rst run separate
regression of log(ci) on Xi and Zi. The residual of this equation is "^i:We then use a exible functional
form to obtain c (). In particular, we estimate the following regression:
log("^i) =
4X
j=0
j
 
log(^i)
j
:
Hence, in our models notation, the estimate of the consumption function is given by
c^ (y) = exp
0@ 4X
j=0
^j (log(y))
j
1A .
Figure 1 displays the estimated consumption function for both of our measures of consumption. Note
that our estimate based on total consumption expenditure displays both signicantly more dispersion
and a higher overall level.
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Figure 1: Estimated Consumption Functions
5.2 The empirical specication of the model
For the quantitative exploration of our model, we move to a formulation with discrete income levels.
We assume that we have N levels of second-period income, denoted by ys; s = 1; : : : ; N; with ys > ys 1.
This implies that the density function of income, f(y; e); is replaced by probability weights ps(e); withPN
s=1 ps(e) = 1 for all e. For the estimation of the parameters, we impose further structure. We
assume
ps(e) = exp( e)ls + (1  exp( e))hs ;
where h and l are probability distributions on the set fy1; : : : ; yNg and  is a positive scalar. In
addition to tractability, this formulation has the advantage that it satises the requirements for the
applicability of rst-order approach given by Abraham, Koehne and Pavoni (2011).15
15Note that we do not need to impose the stochastic dominance condition - which, in our environment, is virtually
equivalent to monotone likelihood ratios (MLR) - as in the proof of the validity of the rst order approach we only need
monotone consumption (see Abraham, Koehne and Pavoni (2011) for details). And as Figure 1 shows this is delivered to
us from the data. Note that MLR is a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for monotone consumption. Nevertheless, as
19
In order to account for (multiplicative) heterogeneity in the data, we allow for heterogeneity in
the initial endowments, specify a unit root process for income shocks, and choose preferences to be
homothetic. In particular, we assume:
u (c; e) =
h
(c) (v (T   e))1 
i1 
 (1  ) ;
where v is a concave function,  2 (0; 1) and  > 0:16
Proposition 7 Consider the following family of homothetic models with heterogeneous agents:
max
ci0;c
i
s;e
i
0
X
i
 i
8><>:
h 
ci0
  
v
 
T   ei0
1 i1 
 (1  ) + 
X
s
ps
 
ei0
 h cis (v (T ))1 i1 
 (1  )
9>=>;
s.t. X
i
 
yi0   ci0

+ q
X
i
X
s
ps
 
ei0
 
yis   cis
  G;
 1  

v0
 
T   ei0

v
 
T   ei0
 h ci0  v  T   ei01 i1  = X
s
p0s
 
ei0
 h cis (v (T ))1 i1 
 (1  ) ;
~q
h 
ci0
  
v
 
T   ei0
1 i1 
ci0
= 
X
s
ps
 
ei0
 h cis (v (T ))1 i1 
cis
;
with  2 (0; 1) ; and ~q; q > 0: Moreover, assume income follows: yis = yi0s: For each given
vector of income levels in period zero
 
yi0

i
> 0 and any scalar  > 0; let the Pareto weights
( i)i be such that the solution to the above problem delivers period zero consumption ci0 = yi0
for all i: Then there exists t 2 R and individual specic transfers ti = tyi0 such that G =
P
i t
i
and the solution to the above problem is
ci0 = y
i
0 for all i;
ei0 = e

0 for all i;
cis = c
i
0 "

s for all i;
where e0 and "s are a solution to the following normalizedproblem
max
"s;e0
h
(v (T   e0))1 
i1 
 (1  ) + 
X
s
ps (e0)
h
("s)
 (v (T ))1 
i1 
 (1  ) ;
expected, our estimated likelihood ratios will exhibit MLR, that is the estimated probability distributions satisfy: hs=
l
s
increasing in s:
16Where, obviously, when  = 1 we assume preferences take a logarithmic form.
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s.t
1

  1 + q
X
s
ps (e0)

s

  "s

 t;
 (1  )

v0 (T   e0)
v (T   e0)
h
(v (T   e0))1 
i1 
= 
X
s
p0s (e0)
h
("s)
 (v (T ))1 
i1 
 (1  ) ;
~q
h
(v (T   e0))1 
i1 
= 
X
s
ps (e0)
h
("s)
 (v (T ))1 
i1 
"s
:
Proof. See Appendix. Q.E.D.
A few remarks are now in order. It should typically be possible to nd a vector of Pareto weights
( i)i such that the postulated individual specic transfers ti = ty0 are indeed optimal. However,
because of potential non-concavitites in the Pareto frontier, it is di¢ cult to establish such a result
formally. We abstract from this subtlety and simply take the existence of such Pareto weights as given
for our analysis. Intuitively, the Pareto weights  i are determined by income at time 0. This depen-
dence can be seen as coming from past incentive constraints or due to type-dependent participation
constraints in period zero.
Proposition 7 is useful for our empirical strategy for at least two main reasons. First, the proposition
suggests that within our empirical model, we are entitled to use the income and consumption residuals
as computed in the previous section as inputs in our estimation/calibration exercise. More precisely,
the proposition suggests that we can use the values "^i and ^i as consumption inputs regardless of the
actual value of ci and yi. In principle, according this proposition, we could go even further and use
residual income and consumption growth in our analysis to identify shocks. We have decided not to
follow that approach for two reasons. First, it requires imposing further structure on the consumption
functions and on the income process. Second, and more importantly, measurement error is known to
be large for both income and consumption. This would be largely exacerbated by taking growth rates.
The other key advantage of the homothetic model is that we can estimate the probability distribu-
tion and all other parameters assuming that e¤ort does not change across agents, hence the rst-order
conditions and expectations are evaluated at the same level of e¤ort e0.17
5.3 Estimation of model parameters
As a rst step, we x some parameters. First of all, we set q = :96 to match a yearly real interest rate
of 4%, which is the historical average of return on real assets in the USA. We then set the coe¢ cient
17Of course, this also implies that we will partially rely on functional forms for identication.
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of relative risk-aversion for consumption to 3; that is 1  (1  ) = 3, in line with recent estimation
results by Paravisini, Rappoport, and Ravina (2010).18 We normalize total time endowment to one
(T = 1) and choose v to be the identity function. For the income process, we set N = 20 and choose
the medians of the 20 percentile groups of cleaned income for the income levels 1; :::; 20. To be
consistent with this choice and with Proposition 7 we set y0 = 1: For expositional simplicity we will
assume  = 1 and hence c0 = y0. Note that Proposition 7 implies that for any level of  we can obtain
the optimal consumption allocation by simply rescaling the consumption allocation of this benchmark.
The only parameter we need to adjust is t or equivalently government consumption G.
Given this choice of parameters, the remaining parameters are chosen to match specic empirical
moments coming from the data. We use the optimality conditions to design a method of moments
estimator for these parameters. We use the identity matrix as a weighting matrix in the estimation.19
The rst group of remaining parameters of the model are the e¤ort technology parameter  and the
probability weights

hs ; 
l
s
	N
s=1
that determine the likelihood ratios. Our target moments for these
parameters are ps(e0) = 1=20 for all s; where e0 is the optimal e¤ort, and "s = c^ (s) ; where "s is the
optimal consumption innovation in the model with an exogenous capital income tax rate of 40 per
cent, i.e., with ~q = q0:6+0:4q .
Since the probabilities ls and 
h
s each sum up to one, we have N   1 parameters each. Moreover,
we have to estimate the parameter . To summarize, we have to estimate 2N   1 parameters and use
the following 2N   1 model restrictions for these parameters:
ps(e

0) = exp( e0)ls + (1  exp( e0))hs for s = 1; :::; N   1, (20)
q

("s)
1 (1 ) = 1 + 
exp( e0)
 
hs   ls

ps(e0)
+ 
1  (1  )
"s
for s = 1; :::; N , (21)
where (21) is the necessary rst-order condition for the optimality of second period consumption.
Notice that these equations also include e0, 
,  and , moreover we have not yet set parameters 
and  either. The parameter  is chosen such that the equilibrium level of e¤ort e0 equals 1=3; which
is roughly the average fraction of working time over total disposable time in the United States. Also
notice that, given ps(e0) = 1=20 and "s = c^ (s) for all s; if we sum equation (21) across income levels
using weights as ps(e0) = 1=20 we obtain
q


1
20
20X
s=1
c^ (s)
1 (1 ) = 1 +
 (1 +    )
20
20X
s=1
1
c^ (s)
: (22)
18We have made some sensitivity analysis with respect to the risk aversion parameter. Our results are qualitatively
the same for the range of risk aversions between one and four, but the di¤erences between the two scenarios are more
pronounced if risk aversion is larger.
19This choice turned out to be irrelevant, because we obtained a practically perfect t for all cases we have considered.
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Consequently, the data implies a further restriction between the parameters and endogenous variables
(; ; ; ), which we impose directly.
For the remaining variables/parameters, we use the following four optimality conditions, which we
require to be satised exactly. First, we have the normalized Euler equation (c0 = 1 is substituted in
all subsequent equations):
~q
h
(1  e0)1 
i1 
= 
NX
s=1
ps (e

0)
[("s)
]1 
"s
: (23)
Then, we can use the rst-order incentive compatibility constraint for e¤ort,
  (1  )
h
(1  e0)1 
i1 
1  e0
=  exp( e0)
NX
s=1

hs   ls
 [("s)]1 
(1  ) ; (24)
and the normalized rst-order conditions for c0;

(1  e0)(1 )(1 )
= 1  ~q (1 +    )  (1  )(1  )
(1  e0)
; (25)
together with the planners rst-order optimality condition for e¤ort
q
X
s
p0s (e

0) (s   "s)+
 

X
s
p00s(e

0)
("s)
(1 )
(1  )  
(1  )(+ (1  ))

(1  e0)  (1 ) 1
!
+ (26)
+
 
 
X
i
p0s(e

0)"
(1 ) 1
s   ~q(1  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Finally we obtain from the governments budget constraint the implied government consumption
as a function of aggregate income as
G = q
 X
i
yi0
!
NX
s=1
ps(e

0)(s   "s): (27)
Here we have used y0   c0 = 0; the unit root process of income and Proposition 7.
We plot the estimated likelihood ratio on Figure 2. As expected (because of the same properties
of the estimated consumption function) the likelihood ratio is monotone and concave.
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Figure 2: Estimated Likelihood Ratio
5.4 Results
We use the preset and estimated/calibrated parameters of the above model (exogenous capital taxes) to
determine the optimal allocation for the scenario where capital taxes are chosen optimally assuming
perfect observability/taxability of capital. Figure 3 displays second-period consumption for this sce-
nario together with the consumption function of the benchmark.
It is obvious from the picture that the average level of second-period consumption is higher in the
case with exogenous capital taxes (tax rate on capital income of 40%). This is of course not surprising,
given that optimal capital taxes in general imply frontloaded consumption (Rogerson 1985, Golosov
et al. 2003).
We also observe that, since consumption is concave for the two cases, optimal labor income taxes
are progressive in both scenarios. First note that we can invoke the rst part of Proposition 6 stating
that if third best consumption c^ is g-concave then second best consumption c is g-concave, too.
Moreover, for relative risk aversion of 3, the function g(c) = qc3= is convex, hence g-concavity
implies concavity. However, recall that for the current computations we did not x e¤ort to be the
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same across the two allocations, which was a requirement for Proposition 6. On the one hand, this
result shows that the endogenous response of e¤ort to imperfect capital taxes does not a¤ect the
qualitative results (at least for this set of parameters). On the other hand, we will also show below
that the changes in e¤ort (and consequently the likelihood ratio) have a non-negligible quantitative
e¤ect.
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Figure 3: Optimal Consumption with Optimal and Restricted Capital Taxation
To compare progressivity across the two scenarios quantitatively, we use  c00(y)=c0(y) as a measure
of progressivity. In addition to the obvious analogy to absolute risk aversion, the advantage compared
to c00(y) is that it makes functions with di¤erent slopes c0(y) more comparable. A higher value of this
measure obviously indicates a higher degree of progressivity. On Figure 4, we have plotted this measure
of progressivity for the optimal consumption plan for the case when capital taxes are restricted and for
the case when they are optimal. The pattern is clear. The model with optimal capital taxes results in
a uniformly more concave (progressive) consumption function compared to the case when capital taxes
are restricted. The di¤erences are particularly large for lower levels of income (and consumption).
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Figure 4: Income Tax Progressivity with Optimal and Restricted Capital Taxation
We have quantied these graphical observations and have checked robustness to alternative levels of
risk aversion in Table 1. The results are qualitatively the same for all risk aversion levels, but there are
signicant quantitative di¤erences. In particular, the di¤erence between the two models is increasing
in the level of risk aversion. The di¤erence between the two progressivity measures is negligible for log
utility, but quite large for the other three cases (ranging between 20 and 100 percent): Note that the
change in measured progressivity is coming from two sources. First, as Figure 3 shows, the concavity
of the optimal consumption function (c(y)) is changing. Second, the distribution of income changes,
as e¤ort is di¤erent under optimal capital taxes compared to the benchmark case. For this reason,
we calculate the measure of progressivity both with and without this second e¤ect (endogenous vs.
exogenous weights). Comparing the rst and second rows of Table 1, we notice that the changing e¤ort
mitigates the increase in progressivity in a non-negligible way only for higher risk aversion levels. This
also implies that e¤ort is indeed higher when optimal capital taxes are levied. In turn, higher e¤ort
implies a higher weight on high income realizations where the progressivity di¤erences are lower (see
Figure 4). In any case, this second indirect e¤ect through e¤ort is small and hence the di¤erence in
the progressivity measure is still increasing in risk aversion.
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We obtain a similar message if we consider the welfare losses due to restricted capital taxation in
consumption equivalent terms (presented in the last row of Table 1). The losses are negligible for the
log case, considerable for the intermediate cases, and very large for high values of risk aversion.
We have also displayed the optimal capital taxes, calculated as k = ~q=q 1. Notice that k is indeed
the tax rate on capital, not on capital income. The 40 percent tax on capital income in the benchmark
model is equivalent to a 1.6% tax on capital. It turns out that optimal taxes are much higher than
this number for all risk aversion levels, including log utility. The tax rates are actually implausibly
high. Even in the log case, they imply a tax rate on capital income of around 90 percent. For our
benchmark case, the implied tax rate on capital income would be around 1000 percent, or equivalently
the after-tax return on savings is -37 percent.20 It is di¢ cult to imagine how such distortionary taxes
can be ever implemented in a world where alternative savings opportunities (potentially with lower
return) are available that are not observable and/or not taxable by the government.
Table 1: Quantitative Measures of Progressivity, Welfare Losses and Capital Taxes
Risk aversion 1 2 3 4
Average measure of progressivity ( c00(y)=c0(y))
Optimal K tax (endog. weights) 0.670 0.800 0.963 1.102
Optimal K tax (exog. weights) 0.670 0.804 0.978 1.141
K tax=1.56 (40% on K income) 0.644 0.644 0.644 0.644
Welfare losses from not taxing capital optimally (%)
0.035 0.295 1.309 3.372
Optimal capital tax (%)
k = ~q=q   1 3.89 25.15 65.82 123.1
We can get some intuition why the di¤erences are increasing in the risk aversion of the agent
(^ := 1  (1  )) by examining equation (21) for our specication:
q

("s)
^    ^
"s
= 1 + 
exp( e0)
 
hs   ls

ps(e0)
for i = 1; :::; N:
The direct e¤ect of restricted capital taxation is driven by a("s). Note that the higher is ^, the higher
is the discrepancy between the Euler equation characterizing the restricted capital taxation case and
the inverse Euler characterizing the optimal capital taxation case. This will imply that  is increasing
with ^. Moreover, absolute risk aversion is given by ^="s, which is also increasing in ^: Hence the
e¤ect of hidden asset accumulation (or suboptimal capital taxes) is increasing in risk aversion for both
20Recall that the after-tax return on capital is given by 1=~q   1. This is equivalent to a tax rate on capital income
dened as t = 1  (1=~q   1)=(1=q   1):
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of these reasons. The larger discrepancy between the Euler and inverse Euler equations also explains
that optimal capital taxes must rise with risk aversion in order to make these two optimality conditions
compatible. The same argument also explains why the welfare costs of restricted capital taxation are
increasing in risk aversion.
As another robustness check, we examined how the results would change if we use only non-durable
consumption as our measure of consumption. As we have seen on Figure 1, the main di¤erence between
the two consumption measures is that non-durable consumption is less dispersed (the average slope
is signicantly lower). Table 2 contains the average measures of progressivity, optimal capital taxes
and the welfare losses of restricted capital taxation for the benchmark risk aversion case. First of
all, note that our normalized measure of progressivity shows that, although non-durable consumption
is atter, the progressivity is very similar (recall that the model with restricted capital taxation
replicates perfectly the consumption allocation for both cases). Second, notice that, with non-durable
consumption, we again have a signicant increase in progressivity when we impose optimal capital
taxes. This once more implies a sizeable welfare gain and a highly implausible tax rate on capital.
The only di¤erence is quantitative: all these properties are somewhat less pronounced: for example
the increase in progressivity here is 25 percent while it is around 50 percent in the benchmark case.
The general message is that whenever the overall level of insurance is higher (consumption responds
less to income shocks), imperfect observability/taxability of capital tends to have a smaller e¤ect.
Table 2: Di¤erent Consumption Measures
Risk aversion = 3 non-durable total expenditure
Average measure of progressivity ( c00(y)=c0(y))
Optimal K tax (endog. weights) 0.849 0.963
Optimal K tax (equal weights) 0.853 0.978
K tax=1.56 (40% on K income) 0.687 0.644
Welfare losses from not taxing capital optimally (%)
0.434 1.309
Optimal capital tax (%)
k = ~q=q   1 37.05 65.82
Hence, we can conclude that the following three main points of our analysis are robust to di¤erent
levels of risk aversion (as far as the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion is not to low) and to di¤erent
measures of consumption: (i) Restricted (as opposed to optimal) capital taxation leads to less progres-
sive optimal income taxes. (ii) There are signicant welfare losses due to this restriction on capital
taxation. (iii) The implied optimal capital taxes are implausibly high.
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Finally, we would like to relate the quantitative results to Proposition 5 as well. There we have
shown that under convex absolute risk aversion, whenever consumption is concave function of the
likelihood ratio in the restricted capital tax case, the same must hold in the model with optimal
capital taxes. Recall that this result was obtained assuming constant e¤ort levels across the two
scenarios. Therefore we compute the optimal allocation for the scenario with 40 percent capital
income taxation given the e¤ort level from the optimal capital tax case. Intuitively, we disregard
the planners optimality condition regarding e¤ort in this case. Figure 5 displays the results of these
calculations as a function of the likelihood ratio, which is (by construction) the optimal likelihood
ratio under optimal capital taxes.
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Figure 5: Optimal Consumption as Function of the Likelihood Ratio (Fixed E¤ort)
This gure is clearly in line with the theoretical results of Proposition 5. First of all, consumption
is a concave function of the likelihood ratio in both scenarios. Moreover, consumption under optimal
capital taxation is a concave transformation of consumption under restricted capital taxation.
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6 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzed how restrictions to capital taxation change the optimal tax code on labor income.
Assuming preferences with convex absolute risk aversion, we found that optimal consumption moves in
a more convex way with labor income when asset accumulation cannot be controlled by the planner. In
terms of our decentralization, this implies that marginal taxes on labor income become less progressive
when restrictions to capital income taxation are binding. We complemented our theoretical results
with a quantitative analysis based on individual level U.S. data on consumption and income.
The model we presented here is one of action moral hazard, similar to Varian (1980) and Eaton
and Rosen (1980). The framework has the important advantage of tractability. Although a more
common interpretation of this model is that of insurance, we believe that it conveys a number of
general principles for optimal taxation that also apply to models of ex-ante redistribution.
While the standard Mirrlees model focuses on the intensive margin (with notable exceptions,
e.g., Choneand Laroque, 2010), the model we consider here focuses on the extensive margin. The
periodic income y is the result of previously supplied e¤ort and is subject to some uncertainty. Natural
interpretations for the outcome y include the result of job search activities, the monetary consequences
of a promotion or a demotion, i.e., of a better or worse match (within the same rm or into a new
rm); or again - for self-employed individuals - y can be seen as earnings from the entrepreneurial
activity. It would not be di¢ cult to include an intensive margin into our model in t = 1. Suppose, for
simplicity, the utility function takes an additive separable form u1 (c) v (n) ; where n represents hours
of work. If we now interpret y as productivity, total income becomes I = yn: Clearly, our analysis
would not change a bit if both y and I were observable, while the case where the government can only
observe I is that of Mirrlees (1971).21
A Simple Dynastic Model: We conclude by proposing a simple extension of our model that
allows for multi-periods with dynastic considerations through warm glowmotives for bequests.
Assume that in the last period preferences are u1(c!k1 !), with ! 2 (0; 1): Here, c is consumption as
21 In this case, the intensive-margin incentive-constraints would take the familiar form: dc(y)
dy
u01 (c (y)) =
v0(n(y))
y
dI(y)
dy
:
The analysis of the intensive margin is standard. If we assume no-bunching, the validity of the FOA for e¤ort, and use
the envelope theorem, it is not di¢ cult to derive the formula for third-best allocations as:
q
u0 (c (y))
= 1 + l (y; e) + a (c (y)) 
d(y)
dy
f (y; e)
; (28)
where the multiplier associated to the intensive-margin incentive-constraint  (y) is - as usual - related to the Spence-
Mirrlees condition and the labor supply distortion,and it satises 
 
y

=  (y) = 0: The comparison between the case
with restricted and unrestricted capital taxation amounts again to considering the cases with  > 0 and  = 0 respectively.
Although the forces at play are the same as above, an analytic analysis with intensive margin (and private information
on y) is complicated by the fact that both ; ; and the whole schedule  () change.
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above, while k represents bequest transfers to future generations. Given the net income y +  (y) in
the last period, the agent solves (note that there are no reasons to impose capital taxes in t = 1, at
least not in order to alleviate incentives):
max
k;c0
u1(c
!k1 !)
s:t: c+ k = y +  (y) :
The chosen functional form implies that expenditures on c and k will be xed proportions of the
disposable income, namely: c (y) = !(y +  (y)); and k (y) = (1   !)(y +  (y)). This model with
bequest is hence equivalent to our original model with utility ~u(y + ) = u1(A (y + )) where u1 is
our original utility function and A = !!(1   !)1 ! is a constant. Clearly, none of our theoretical
results changes, since properties such as the convexity of the absolute risk aversion are invariant to
this modication. We did not nd any sizable quantitative di¤erence either.22 Since we are interested
in the curvature of the consumption function and its changes due to restrictions to capital income
taxation, it is intuitive that such extension has little impact on our results.
It is not di¢ cult to see how such model can be embedded into a fully dynastic framework. When y
is observed, k is easily computable as a (deterministic) function of y+ since the warm glow mechanics
does not leave space for strategic considerations in the inter-generational transfer of wealth. Then k
would play the role of y0 for the next generation. Of course, this framework generates heterogeneity
in the initial endowments. However, the link between c0 and y0 would be dictated by distributional
motives alone (i.e., no incentive constraint would play any role here), along the lines of the quantitative
section. Details are available upon request.
22Details are available upon request. In our robustness computations, ! has been calibrated to match the top bracket.
Alternatively, one could set this parameter so that to match the average marginal propensity to consume in the population.
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Appendix: Proof of Proposition 7.
The linear separability of the planners problem implies that, given individual transfers ti; the optimal
allocation must solve the following individual contracting problem:
V i = max
ci0;c
i
s;e
i
0
 i
8><>:
h 
ci0
  
v
 
T   ei0
1 i1 
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X
s
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 h cis (v (T ))1 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 (1  )
9>=>;
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;
with  i > 0: Because preferences are homothetic, the incentive constraints depend only on "is = c
i
s=c
i
0 and e
i
0:
We can hence change the choice variables and rewrite the individual contracting problem as
V i = max
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Now x some individual j. By continuity we can nd a transfer tj such that the solution (cj0 ; e
j
0 ; "
j
s ) to the
associated individual problem satises cj0 = y
j
0: By non-satiation of preferences, t
j is given by
tj = yj0   yj0 + qyj0
X
s
ps

ej0
 
s   "js 

=: yj0t
:
We claim that transfers dened as ti := yi0t
 imply that for all i the contract
ci0 = y
i
0;
ei0 = e
j
0 ; and
"is = "
j
s ;
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solves the individual contracting problem. Suppose the claim is false for some i. By the construction of transfers,
the contract (yi0; e
j
0 ; "
j
s ) is incentive-feasible. Hence if the claim is false the value V i must be strictly higher
than the one generated by (yi0; e
j
0 ; "
j
s ): This implies
V i >  i
 
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(1 )
8>>><>>>:

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On the other hand, the contract (ci0 y
j
0=y
i
0; e
i
0 ; "
i
s ) is incentive-feasible for the individual contracting problem
V j : Hence we get
V j   j
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Taken together, the two inequalities imply V i > V i, a contradiction. Q.E.D.
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